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CASE NOTES

Constitutional

Law-SEARCH OF AN ATrORNEY'S OFFICE HELD UNREASONABLE UNDER THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION--O'Connorv. John-

son, 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
The United States Supreme Court has held that police may search the
premises of nonsuspect third parties who possess evidence of the criminal
acts of another.' These third-party searches, like all searches, must be
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 2 To date, the
Court has not defined the circumstances under which a search of a third
party pursuant to a valid warrant would be unreasonable. 3 The Minnesota Supreme Court faced this issue in O'Connorv. Johnson.4 In O'Connor,

the court held that a warrant for the search of an attorney's office is
unreasonable under the Minnesota Constitution5 when there is no show1. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) ("Under existing law,
valid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a third
party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence
of a crime will be found." (emphasis in original)).
In Zurcher, photographers working for the Stanford Daily newspaper took photographs of a demonstration in which several policemen were assaulted. The newspaper
published stories and pictures of the incident. The police obtained a warrant to search the
newspaper's office in an effort to identify the attackers from the unpublished photographs.
436 U.S. at 551. With members of the newspaper staff present, a search was made of
"photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets." Id. No useful
materials were found and nothing was removed from the office. Id. at 551-52.
Third-party searches are a fairly recent development in the area of search and
seizure. Prior to the decision of Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Supreme
Court had recognized a difference between merely evidentiary materials on the one hand
and weapons, contraband, and instrumentalities of a crime on the other. The "mere evidence" could not legally be seized. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947),
overruledon othergrounds, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932). The Hayden Court rejected this distinction as a limitation on the scope of permissible searches by stating that "[n]othing in the language of the
Fourth Amendment supports the distinction between 'mere evidence' and instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, or contraband. . . . Indeed the distinction is wholly irrational,
since, depending on the circumstances, the same 'papers and effects' may be 'mere evidence' in one case and 'instrumentality' in another." 387 U.S. at 301-02. By abandoning
the "mere evidence" restriction, the Court exposed a larger group of people to the possibility of a search because totally uninvolved persons could be in possession of evidence of a
crime. See generally id. at 309.
2. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-60 (1978); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967);
Brett v. United States, 412 F.2d 401, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1969).
3. See notes 45-46 infra and accompanying text.
4. 287 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1979).
5. See id. at 405. The language of the Minnesota Constitution and the United States
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches is identical. Compare MINN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10 with U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This, however, does not prevent the state court from
giving the same words a different interpretation, as long as the state interpretation meets
the minimum standards set by the United States Supreme Court. See notes 42-43 infra
and accompanying text.
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ing that the attorney himself is suspected of criminal activity or that the
evidence sought is in danger of being destroyed. 6 In all other circumstances police must resort to a subpoena duces tecum 7 to obtain specified
materials.
In O'Connor, investigations into liquor establishments led local police to
believe false written statements had been made in the applications for
liquor licenses of a certain bar. A search warrant for business records
thought to be on the premises of the bar was obtained. When the police
attempted to carry out the warrant, they were told the records were in
the possession of the attorney of the former owners. The police then obtained a second warrant from a district court for a search of the attor8
ney's office.
When the police sought to execute the second warrant at the attorney's
office, the attorney refused to permit the search. Gathering all the
materials described in the warrant, including his work-product file, the
attorney persuaded the police to accompany him to the issuing judge's
chambers for a determination of the legality of the search. The judge
allowed the attorney to keep the work-product file until he ruled on the
validity of the search. Subsequently, the court held the search was valid.
The work-product material was ordered into the custody of the county
attorney, who would determine if any of the file was privileged. The bar
owner's lawyer petitioned the supreme court for a writ of prohibition
challenging that part of the judge's order requiring the production of his
6. See 287 N.W.2d at 405. If an attorney is implicated in criminal activity, a search
warrant will issue regardless of the nature of the premises or the status of the person to be
searched. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (attorney convicted of fraud on
basis of evidence found in his office pursuant to search). The courts also will not allow a
privilege to be used in a manner that is inconsistent with the policy behind the privilege.
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("However, since the privilege has
the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where
necessary to achieve its purpose."); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.)
(communication not intended to be confidential is not within attorney-client privilege),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); United States v. Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir.
1971) (disclosure between client and attorney made in commission of crime or fraud is not
privileged), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing &
Redevelopment Auth., 310 Minn. 313, 322-23, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976) (privilege allowed if not abused); cf. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913) (documents do not
become privileged simply by handing them over to an attorney).
7. In criminal cases a clerk of court may issue a subpoena to compel the appearance
of a witness before the court, a grand jury, or at a deposition. Similarly, a subpoena may
order a person to produce documentary evidence or objects. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 22;
notes 19-20 ina and accompanying text.
Traditionally, a subpoena duces tecum orders the appearance of a person and the
production of documents and things, whereas a subpoena simply orders the appearance of
a person. Today, some courts no longer make this distinction and call all such orders
subpoenas.
8. 287 N.W.2d at 401.
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work-product material.9
While the matter was pending, the district court amended its order so
that it, not the county attorney, would determine which documents were
protected.10 On appeal the supreme court refused to rule on the
amended order and the actions taken by the police in the actual execution of the warrant.It Instead, the court addressed the reasonableness of
2
searching an attorney's office when the attorney has not acted illegally. 1
The court held such searches to be unreasonable.13 The decision was
compelled by the threat searches of attorneys' offices would pose to the
attorney-client privilege, client confidentiality, the work-product doctrine and a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 14
1
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized in Minnesota. 5
Its purpose is to encourage clients to disclose all facts relevant to their
case, both favorable and unfavorable.16 Without complete knowledge of
9. Id.
10. Id.
I1. When the police originally attempted to execute the search warrant, O'Connor
was present at the office and the police were willing to allow him to bring all the affected
materials to the judge for a determination of the legality of the warrant prior to any actual
seizure. The office was never searched, despite the right of the officers to do so under the
warrant. Id. at 402. In declining to rule on the legality of the actions actually taken, the
court made the following statement:
[I]t would be relatively easy to find on this record no violation of constitutional
rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the work product doctrine, and thus to
approve a hybrid procedure-part warrant, part subpoena. This we decline to
do. We must instead examine the validity of the search warrant upon which the
court's order was based to determine the propriety of that order.
Id. The court may rule on the warrant itself and not be limited to a consideration of its
actual execution. See United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1955); People v. Royse, 173 Colo. 254, 477 P.2d 380 (1970). Seegenerally J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACcUSED, Pre-TrialRights § 27 (1972).
12. 287 N.W.2d at 402.
13. Id. at 405.
14. Id. at 402.
15. See, e.g., Kahl v. Minnesota Wood Specialty, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn.
1979); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 552, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1942); State v. Nelson,
91 Minn. 143, 148, 97 N.W. 652, 654 (1903); Struckmeyer v. Lamb, 75 Minn. 366, 77
N.W.987 (1899).
The privilege also is statutory. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1980).
16. See, e.g., Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.) (allows client to
communicate freely with his attorney), afd, 339 U.S. 974 (1950); Magida v. Continental
Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (privilege is expression of policy that sacrifices
full disclosure for preservation of adequate attorney-client relationship); Holm v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 506-07, 267 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1954) (purpose of privilege is to encourage client to make full disclosure of all facts without fear of others being informed),
overuled in part on othergrounds, Suezaki v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 166, 373 P.2d 432, 23
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962); State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 832, 394 P.2d 681,
684 (1964) ("afford[s] the client freedom from fear of compulsory disclosure after consulting his legal advisor"). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Fried, The Lawyer as FndThe Moral Foundationsof
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976).
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the facts, an attorney cannot "effectively fulfill his roles as counselor, intermediary and advocate." 1 7 If statements to an attorney may be seized
under a search warrant, privileged information may be exposed thereby
inhibiting full disclosure by a client. To the O'Connor court, this result
would interfere seriously with the functioning of the adversary system.18
A subpoena, on the other hand, does not present a similar danger. The
subpoena process, unlike the warrant process, allows the attorney to
quash a demand for bona fide privileged materials.19 Therefore, disclosures made to an attorney by the client can remain protected. 20
Closely related to the attorney-client privilege is the obligation of an
attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client.21 This ethical responsibility is designed to facilitate "the full development of facts
essential to the proper representation of the client."2 2 The O'Connor
court regarded the ethical obligation of confidentiality as an interest sep17.
18.

See Kahl v. Minnesota Wood Specialty, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 1979).
See 287 N.W.2d at 403. One commentator has made the following observation

about the potentially disruptive effect of invading the attorney-client relation:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for the
party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to the relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to change our customs
so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine examination upon the client's
confidential disclosures regarding professional business.
C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 176 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972).
The Canadian courts also have been struggling with the issue of searching attorneys'
offices. In the past, Canadian procedure allowed a client, who had privileged materials
seized from his attorney's office, to attempt to exclude the evidence only at trial. This
provided very little client protection since there was no mechanism to prevent the search
in the first place, before the damage was done. A recent decision, however, held that the
attorney-client privilege was more than an evidentiary rule, thereby opening the possibility that third-party searches of attorneys' offices will be restricted in the future. See Re
B.X. Development Inc., 31 Can. Crim. Cas. 2d 14, 17 (B.C. App. 1976) ("warrant can be
quashed when it seizes documents which are plainly subject to the solicitor-client privilege"). see generay~. Comment, Recent Developments in the CanadianLaw of Solicitor-Cl'ntP'vilege, 24 McGILL L.J. 115 (1978); Comment, Pn'ilege--Soliwtor and Client-Whether
Applicable to Powers of Search and Seizure, 7 MANITOBA L.J. 341 (1977).
19. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 22.02 deals with the production of documentary evidence
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The rule states in part that "[t]he court on motion
made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable
or oppressive." Id. This provision allows the affected parties to challenge the validity of
the subpoena and claim appropriate privileges prior to any actual seizure.
A subpoena duces tecum may be found to be an illegal search and seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (subpoena may be so indefinite that it does not "particularly describe" what is sought).
20. See Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964) (subpoena
duces tecum quashed on ground that material sought was protected by attorney-client
privilege); cf. Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) (subpoena duces
tecum upheld because attorney-client privilege not applicable to material sought).
21. See ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980).
22. Id.
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arate from the attorney-client privilege that a search of an attorney's office would violate. 23 This may not have been an accurate analysis. The
distinction between the attorney-client privilege and client confidentiality is a fine one. The attorney-client privilege prevents other parties from
gaining access to certain material through the judicial process. 2 4 The
ethical obligation of confidentiality prevents an attorney from voluntarily disclosing secrets of his client. 25 In O'Connor, this difference is of no
significance, because the disclosure was involuntary. An attorney does
not violate any ethical duty to his client by having his office unwillingly
subjected to a search. The court's use of the ethical obligation of confidentiality, however, does reemphasize the negative effect a search would
have on the attorney-client relationship and the proper functioning of
26
the adversary system.
Another privilege, the work-product doctrine,2 7 also would be affected
23. See 287 N.W.2d at 403.
24. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 416
U.S. 980, cert dnid, 416 U.S. 979 (1974) (cases consolidated on appeal, separate denials of
certiorari); Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1977); Hearn v. Rhay, 68

F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975); State v. Lender, 266 Minn. 561, 563-64, 124 N.W.2d 355,
357-58 (1963); Snyker v. Snyker, 245 Minn. 405, 406-07, 72 N.W.2d 357, 358 (1955);
MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(1) ("[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged").
25. See ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).
26. The O'Connor court stated:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the
proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of
the confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.
A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer
must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client.
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in
order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system.
287 N.W.2d at 403 (quoting ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
4-1 (1980)).
There is a great deal of controversy currently over the breadth of the ethical obligation of an attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client. See A TLA Unveils
Ethics Code, Nat'l L.J., June 23, 1980, at 3, col. 2. The American Bar Association recently
submitted a proposed revision of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This proposal
has come under attack for allegedly "eroding the confidentiality of client confidences" by
allowing too great an opportunity for the attorney to disclose information without violating ethical precepts. Id. at 8, col. 1. In response, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America formulated their own proposal that would "[p]revent lawyers from disclosing
client confidences in virtually all cases, and require such disclosure in none." Id. The
difference of opinion within the legal profession indicates that while the concept of confidentiality is universally accepted, its parameters are not.
27. An attorney's work product is protected in most instances from discovery in civil
and criminal litigation. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.02(3). The
criminal rule provides: "Information Not Subject to Disclosure by Defendant; Work
Product. Unless otherwise provided by these rules, legal research, records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent they contain opinions, theories or conclusions
of the defendant or his counsel or persons participating in the defense are not subject to
disclosure." Id.
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detrimentally by a search according to the O'Connor court. The purpose
of the work-product privilege is to shield an attorney's opinions and strategies from discovery.28 The rationale is that an attorney in fear of having his case exposed would be inclined not to document his thoughts
thoroughly. 29 This in turn would lessen the effectiveness of an attorney's
representation of a client. Once again, the client and the adversary sys30
tem would suffer.
Finally, the O'Connor court viewed a search of the office of an attorney
of a criminal defendant as a possible infringement upon a defendant's
constitutional right to counsel.31 The result of such a search would not
necessarily deprive the accused of counsel. The adequacy of the attorney's representation, however, through the cumulative effect of a search
on the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, may be
32
reduced below constitutional guarantees.
The O'Connor court concluded by expressing its concern that a search
of an attorney's office may result in a prohibited general search.33 The
court stated that because of the extensiveness of the warrant there was
28. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Leiniger v. Swadner, 279 Minn.

251, 256, 156 N.W.2d 254, 258 (1968).
29. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the Court described the policy of
protecting work product as follows:
Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly
served.
Id. at 511.
30. See 287 N.W.2d at 403. The dangers created by work-product disclosure are amplified in criminal cases in which the defendant's liberty is at stake. See United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("Although the work-product doctrine most frequently is
asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning
of the criminal justice system is even more vital."). The O'Connor court expressed its agreement with this view by stating: "The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a
fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case." 287
N.W.2d at 403 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975)).
31. 287 N.W.2d at 404. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. 1,

§ 6.
32. Ste 287 N.W.2d at 404. The right to counsel is the right to "effective" counsel.
See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 763-64 (1945) (per curiam); Wilson v. Phend, 417
F.2d 1197, 1199-2000 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th
Cir. 1963); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960); Risher v. State, 523
P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 1974); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 424, 590 P.2d 859, 865-66,
152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 738-39 (1979).
33. 287 N.W.2d at 404-05. General "rummaging" in the course of a search is prohibited under the fourth amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971); State v. Mathison, 263 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Minn. 1978); State v. Streitz, 258 N.W.2d
768, 771-72 (Minn. 1977).
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"no way the police officers could be sure that they had found all the
items to be seized unless they searched every file in the attorney's office." 3 4 Thus, the privacy and interests of all the attorney's clients, not
just the one against whom the search was directed, would be
threatened. 35 No matter how particular the warrant, a search always
would expose privileged material to the police, and in many instances,
36
the damage would be irreparable.
Determining constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches
and seizures requires a balancing of the public's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's right to be free from overly intrusive
police actions. 37 By favoring the subpoena process over a search, the
O'Connor court brought these conflicting interests into a manageable
equilibrium. The client and attorney are able to protect privileged material with judicial proceedings, 38 while the police are still free to obtain all
nonprivileged evidence. The police are not absolutely deprived of the
use of a search. If the attorney is suspected of criminal wrongdoing or it
is shown the evidence is in danger of being destroyed, a search will be
34. 287 N.W.2d at 404.
35. See id. If the police were allowed to "search every file in the office," other clients'
confidential material would be examined. See id.It is possible the material could implicate other clients of the attorney in a crime. An investigation or prosecution could result.
The evidence most likely would be admissible under the "plain-view doctrine," even
though the documents were not listed in the warrant and relate to a totally different
crime. Three criteria must be met before evidence will be admitted under the plain-view
doctrine: (1)the evidence must be found pursuant to a legal intrusion; (2) the evidence
must be found inadvertently; and (3) the criminal nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-69 (1971). Since the
police would be in the attorney's office under the authority of a warrant, the initial intrusion would be justified. Also, if the police were not expecting to find the evidence incriminating another client, the discovery would be inadvertent. See United States v. Hare, 589
F.2d 1291, 1293-95 (6th Cir. 1979). While the "immediately apparent" requirement
would be more difficult to meet, it would not be impossible. The police obviously would
have to scan documents to determine if the warrant included the documents. This is
permissible under the plain-view doctrine. See Mapp v. Warden, 531 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976). Thus, if a superficial examination gives the police
probable cause to believe the document indicated criminal activity, the seizure would be
valid. See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 955 (1980). While the plain-view doctrine will not be allowed to justify general exploratory searches, see United States v. Pincus, 450 F. Supp. 66, 69-70 (W.D. Pa. 1978), the
O'Connor prohibition against searches of attorneys' offices forecloses the possibility of such
a result. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.11 (1978).
36. See 287 N.W.2d at 405; Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 31, 62 N.W.2d
688, 699 (1954) (once privileged material is seen, information cannot be erased from adversary's mind).
37. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-56
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 53 (1967); State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978).
38. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
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allowed.3 9 Considering the ultimate effect a search.would have on the
adversary system, a subpoena duces tecum is an adequate alternative
40
means of gaining evidence in the possession of an attorney.
39. See 287 N.W.2d at 405; note 7 supra.
40. In summarizing its requirement that police obtain a subpoena duces tecum, the
O'Connor court stated:
Though this may seem as limiting the ability of the police to obtain information
in the early stages of an investigation, we find this measure necessary to protect
the overriding interest of our society in preserving the attorney-client privilege,
client confidentiality, the work product doctrine, and the constitutional right to
counsel.
287 N.W.2d at 405. The Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) held an opposite opinion. A subpoena, in the Court's view, would hamper initial
police inquiries unjustifiably. See id. at 560-62. In Minnesota a subpoena may be issued
only by a grand jury or after a criminal complaint has been filed. See MINN. R. CRIM. P.
22.01. Therefore, only a subpoena issued by a grand jury could help police in the investigatory stage of a case. In many counties, however, a grand jury does not sit continuously.
See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.01 ("grand jury shall be summoned and convened whenever
required by public interest or whenever requested by the county attorney"). Summoning
a grand jury for the sole purpose of issuing a subpoena would be very expensive and
cumbersome, and represent an inefficient police procedure. Thus, the O'Connor court's
substitution of a subpoena for a search warrant may be more complicated than is stated.
The Zurcher Court also expressed concern that in some cases the third party would
ignore the subpoena, or respond so slowly that the evidence could be destroyed by the
suspect. See 436 U.S. at 560-62. Because attorneys are the third parties called upon to
submit to a subpoena under O'Connor-type facts, this possibility is minimized. As officers
of the court, attorneys are required to respond "faithfully and promptly" to a subpoena.
See 287 N.W.2d at 405.
While it acknowledged the legitimate public interest in quick and efficient police
work, see id., the O'Connor court did not believe that warrant searches of nonsuspect-attorneys' offices were the least drastic means to this legitimate end. The standard of "least
drastic means" in achieving a valid and substantial end was discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, an Arkansas
statute required teachers to disclose all the organizations to which they had contributed or
belonged in the preceding five years. The Court held that when a less intrusive means
exists to achieve the same end, a more intrusive means is unconstitutional under the first
amendment. The Court stated:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Id. at 488; see Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941-45 (9th Cir. 1971); Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 519-23, 537 P.2d
268, 277-79 (1975) (citing Zurcher trial court). The "less drastic means" standard has been
incorporated into the recent federal statute controlling the procedures to be used in thirdparty searches. See notes 51-56 infla and accompanying text.
A California case, Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 253, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 857 (1980), dealt with a factual situation identical to that in O'Connor. The
Deukmejian court, however, did not have to make a ruling on the constitutionality of a
search of an attorney's office. While the appeal to quash the warrant was pending, the
California Legislature passed a statute regulating searches of attorneys' offices. Id. at 259-
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It is important that O'Connor was decided under the Minnesota Constitution.4 1 The states are free to give their citizens greater protection
under state law than that provided by the minimum standards established in the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. 42 In the area of search and seizure, states have not been hesitant
43
to do SO.

The use of the Minnesota Constitution provides two closely related
advantages in this case. Although the Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Dail "4 indicated that not every third-party search meeting the war60, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 861. The statute provides that the affidavit in support of the search
must indicate an attorney's office is the target of the search. A special master is appointed
to accompany the police. The special master must provide the attorney with an opportunity to voluntarily comply with the warrant. If the attorney refuses, the special master is
free to conduct the search. If the attorney raises a claim of privilege to any of the documents, the material is placed in a sealed envelope by the special master. The court then
will determine the applicability of any privilege. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1523-42 (West
Cum. Supp. 1980).
The Deukmi~gn court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute until the
process was seen against a more developed factual background. 103 Cal. App. 3d at 263,
162 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The statute, in essence, calls for a procedure similar to the search in
O'Connor-part search and part subpoena. The police can acquire nonprivileged documents immediately. On the other hand, the attorney can protect privileged material in a
judicial proceeding, just as in the use of a subpoena. The material that is claimed to be
privileged, however, is in the possession of the court prior to any determination. Therefore, any material that is subsequently found to be nonprivileged cannot be destroyed.
The statute seems to provide a middle-ground approach, avoiding the extremes of both
Zurcher and O'Connor.
41. Although the O'Connor court based its holding on both the federal and state constitutions, the only United States Supreme Court decision addressing the issue of thirdparty searches does not prohibit as constitutionally unreasonable searches of nonsuspectattorneys' offices. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); note 49 onfra. Thus,
O'Connor must be viewed as being based primarily on the Minnesota Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution. See 287 N.W.2d at 405 ("A more important
distinction between this case and Zurcher is that our decision rests not only on the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution but also on Article I, section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution.").
42. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
Some members of the United States Supreme Court have indirectly encouraged state
courts to interpret their state constitutions more broadly than the United States Supreme
Court interprets the United States Constitution. Se Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 117 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protecion of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).

43. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975) (scope of search for weapons); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974)
(scope of search incident to arrest); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(warrantless eavesdropping), cert. &ned, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J.
349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (knowledge necessary to consent to search); State v. Opperman,
-

S.D. -,

247 N.W.2d 673 (1976) (inventory search).

44. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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rant clause will be reasonable, distinct guidelines were not enunciated by
the Court. 45 Therefore, an expansion of Zurcher could hold a search of an
innocent attorney's office to be constitutional.46 The O'Connor court was
not willing to chance such an outcome. In light of the consequences this
type of search would have, there was a need for certainty. Basing the
O'Connor decision on the state constitution allowed the issue to be settled
definitely and put the decision beyond Supreme Court reversal.47 A second, ancillary reason arises from the Zurcher Court's refusal to require the
use of a subpoena as a general rule in third-party search situations.48
That decision implies that any determination of the reasonableness of a
third-party search necessarily would be on a case-by-case basis. 49 Thus,
the constitutionality of searching an attorney's office would have to be
examined on the individual facts of each case. The O'Connor court, however, required that attorneys be protected as a general class from future,
third-party searches. Only by having a broad prohibition against searching attorneys' offices would the integrity of the adversary system be preserved. The O'Connor court's interpretation of the Minnesota
Constitution secures this goal.
In Minnesota it is clear that attorneys who are not suspected of crimi45. See 436 U.S. at 559-60. Justice Powell stated that "the reasonableness of every
warrant ... [must be judged] in light of the circumstances of the particular case, carefully
considering the description of the evidence sought, the situation of the premises, and the
position and interests of the owner or occupant." Id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring). This
statement suggests that a search of an attorney's office could be found to be unreasonable
even though supported by probable cause and affidavit. Such a determination, however,
would depend on a case-by-case analysis of reasonableness. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
46. Justice Stevens in his dissent practically prophesized the dangers considered by
the O'Connor court. He stated:
Countless law-abiding citizens--doctors, lawyers, merchants, customers, bystanders-may have documents in their possession that relate to an ongoing
criminal investigation. The consequences of subjecting this large category of
persons to unannounced police searches are extremely serious. The exparte warrant procedure enables the prosecutor to obtain access to privileged documents
that could not be examined if advance notice gave the custodian an opportunity
to object. The search for the documents described in a warrant may involve the
inspection of files containing other private matter.
436 U.S. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). See also Falk, Are Law
Ofces Safe?, BARRISTER, Spring 1979, at 17; Minwesota Lawyers Face Threat of Third-Party
Searches, 65 A.B.A.J. 532 (1979); Search-1WarrantFever Spreads to Calif Firms, 65 A.B.A.J. 886
(1979); Will Lawyers Be Giving Stanford Warnings?, 64 A.B.A.J. 1211 (1978).
47. The O'Connor decision is not subject to reversal, because the result gives more
protection to citizens' privacy interests than does Zurcher. See cases cited note 42 supra.
48. See id. at 567-68.
49. The reasonableness of a search must be determined on the facts of each case. See
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1969); State v. Gebhard, 272 Minn. 336, 342,
137 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1965); State v. Kinderman, 271 Minn. 405, 411-12, 136 N.W.2d
577, 581-82 (1965), cert. denid, 384 U.S. 909 (1966). Without a general rule prohibiting
third-party searches, it must be assumed that the determination would be on a case-bycase basis.
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nal activity themselves cannot have their offices subjected to searches.
O'Connor, however, may be limited to attorneys, leaving other Minnesota
professionals in possession of privileged materials open to third-party
searches.50 While Zurcher provides little in the way of constitutional standards to evaluate the potential scope of third-party searches, recent legislation should clear up much of the confusion, at least in the federal
field.51 This law limits federal and state officials to the use of a subpoena
when the material sought is work product under the control of a "newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication."52 Furthermore, the statute directs the Attorney General to
develop procedural guidelines for federal officers who seek access to documents in the possession of innocent third parties,53 with special consideration given to lawyers, doctors, and clergy. 54 The recently published
guidelines indicate that a subpoena generally should be utilized before a
search, unless the use of a subpeona would "substantially jeopardize [the
document's] availability . . . or usefulness."55 While the above guide-

lines will not restrict state officials from using a third-party search for
50. In Minnesota, the privileged communications of clergy and doctors are statutorily
protected. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3)-(4) (1980). These privileges are similar to the
attorney-client privilege because certain communications made within the relationship are
immune from disclosure in court actions or proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Staat, 291
Minn. 394, 192 N.W.2d 192 (1971) (physician); In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W.
589 (1931) (priest).
A search exposing doctors' and clergys' confidential materials would not have as
broad an impact as that of a search of an attorney's office. For example, the work-product
doctrine apd the constitutional right to counsel would not be jeopardized. The doctor and
clergy privileges, however, do promote the development of important relationships.
Therefore, special considerations should be given to the protection of these privileges from
overly intrusive police action. See notes 54-55 infa and accompanying text.
51. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 49 U.S.L.W. 185 (Dec. 9,
1980).
52. See id. tit. I, § 101, 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 185 (Dec. 9, 1980). A search is allowed only
when the person to be searched is suspected of an offense or immediate seizure is necessary
to prevent death or serious bodily harm. See id. § 101(a)(l)-(2), 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 185
(Dec. 9, 1980). In circumstances in which work product is not sought, a search is allowed
for the reasons stated above or if there is a chance the subpoena would be ignored or the
evidence is in danger of being destroyed. See id. § 101(b)(l)-(4), 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 185
(Dec. 9, 1980).
53. The Act requires that any method proposed by the Attorney General be "the least
intrusive method or means . . .which doles] not substantially jeopardize the availability
or usefulness" of the documents. See id. tit. II, § 201(a) (2), 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 186 (Dec. 9,
1980).
54. See ad. § 201(a) (3), 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 186 (Dec. 9, 1980).
55. See Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third
Parties, 46 Fed. Reg. 1302, 1303 (1981) (to be codified in C.F.R. § 59.1(b)). The guidelines also give procedures to be followed when the material is held by a third-party attorney, doctor, or clergyman and confidential material will be subject to inspection. See id. at
1303-04 (to be codified in C.F.R. § 59.4(b)) (search should not be used in most circumstances).
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arguably privileged material,56 state legislatures may be spurred into
clarifying the presently uncertain boundaries of third-party searches
under state law.

Criminal

Law-HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED TESTIMONY HELD INADMISSI-

BLE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING-.ae

. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.

1980).
The admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony was first con-

fronted by the American judicial system in People v. Ebanks,' an 1897
California case. 2 The Ebanks court held that exculpatory statements
made by defendant while under hypnosis were inadmissible, indicating
that hypnosis could not be used to establish a defense to a crime. 3 Following Ebanks and its progeny the issue of hypnotically-induced testimony generally was dormant within the courts 4 until the 1950 North
56. While title I of the Act applies to both federal and state officials, title II, which
deals with third parties that are not associated with the dissemination of information to
the public, applies only to federal employees. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-440, tit. II, § 201, 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 186 (Dec. 9, 1980).
1. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897). In Ebanks, the defendant sought to call an expert
witness to the stand to testify that the defendant was not guilty based on statements made
to the hypnotist while the defendant was in a hypnotic trance. See id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
In an earlier case, the California Supreme Court was presented with the defense of hypnotic suggestion but the court did not discuss the legal admissibility of the defense. See
People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1894).
2. See Note, Hypnotaim andthe Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1519 (1961) (question of
whether statements made during hypnosis could be admitted as evidence was first before
American courts in 1897 case of People v.Ebanks).
In the late 1800's, two European cases were recorded in which hypnotists were
charged with "seduction abetted by hypnosis" and a third case involved not only the
defense that the crime of murder had been induced by hypnosis but also the use of hypnosisas an investigative tool. See Herman, The Use Of Hypno-Induced Statements In Criminal
Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1964). These European cases sparked an immediate interest by the American criminal bar and led to attempts by defense lawyers to use hypnosis to
acquit their clients. See id.at 2. There were a number of early cases involving either the
defense of hypnotic suggestion or the admissibility of statements under hypnosis. See, e.g.,
People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897); People v. Worthington, 105
Cal. 166, 172, 38 P. 689, 691 (1894); Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 512-17, 96 N.Y.S. 814,
815-19 (1906). These early cases tended to involve sexual crimes perpetrated against hypnotized persons. See Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotssm, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 178 (1902).
3. See 117 Cal. at 665, 49 P. at 1053. The California Supreme Court examined the
trial court's finding that "[t]he law of the United States does not recognize hypnotism"
and that, consequently, the offer by defendant of testimony elicited from him while under
hypnosis "would be an illegal defense." Id. The supreme court concluded: "We shall not
stop to argue the point, and only add the court was right." Id.
4. See Herman, supra note 2, at 2. "[F]rom 1894 to 1915, there were a number of
cases involving . . . the admissibility of exculpatory statements made under hypnosis. . . . However, judicial hostility was manifest. . . . [Fjrom 1915 until 1950, there was
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